HARRY - That's probably the BEST summation of the book and what happened to IH I've read.
IH was able to design and build as cost effectively as ANY company. They wrote the book on Vertical integration in manufacturing. They had their own share of an iron mine in Minnesota, two of their own lake going ore ships, their own steel mill, their own coal mines and lumber mills & forests, made their own hardware. There was much more IH material in every IH machine than ANY of their competitors.
Their machines were designed to be durable, functional, no fancy unnecessary bells & whistles, just simple, productive machines people could use for work to make MONEY. IH promotional material stressed the productivity of IH equipment constantly. They may not have ever had the leading edge technology in ALL fields but they spent enough money on R&D to offer state-of-the-art advancements in many. They were one of the first to offer something similar to the Torque-Amplifier, first Hydro-static drive full size farm tractor, they released their Axial flow rotary combine a year after New Holland released theirs. IH worked on it for close to ten years. First practical "Plate-less corn/bean planter" with the IH Cyclo planter. They started building trucks so farmer's could haul their crops to market and ended up being the largest medium & heavy truck maker for many many years. They bought Solar Company out in California back in 1960 to investigate turbine engine use in large over-the-road trucks and off-road equipment like bull dozers & ag tractors. IH sold Solar off in 1981 to CAT to get cash. Solar had always been profitable for IH, but turbine engines never achieved the fuel efficiency that a diesel engine did in trucks & tractors.
SO... All that being said, IH should have been eminently profitable. And they did make money, but felt they had to pay a stockholder's dividend every year, even if they had to borrow the money, which the did frequently. Their Marketing Dept forced them into businesses they should have avoided, or to make machines for small niche markets that would never result in the volume of product where their productivity would allow them adequate margin on their sales to cover the development costs. They wanted to be #1 in ALL their markets and in many they were, but around the mid-1950's they should have abandoned several markets so they could concentrate on their primary businesses. Trucks never performed as well as they should have, construction didn't do well either. I remember our Plant Manager, Matt Glogowski, telling all the salaried & management people at FARMALL in early 1981 that if FARMALL could run WIDE OPEN, 170-175 tractors per day, FARMALL could have bailed IH out of debt all by it's self in less than one year since so many other IH plants supplied materials to FARMALL. By then IH was real close to owing the banks more oney than they were worth, and paying way too high of interest rates on it all. Problem was the entire ag tractor market was only selling 200-250 tractors per week back then of the sizes FARMALL made.
IMO, the strong arm of the Markketing dept., and the inability of management to tell them "NO" is what got IH into trouble. Too many big ego's in their marketing dept. for them to survive.